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Homeland Defense via the Web
How to Secure the Homeland
Without Leaving the House
By Jonathan
Rauch
The homeland-security worry of the month is chemical plants, and
with good reason. More than 7,700 of them, according to the Environmental
Protection Agency, are located in places where a thousand or more people could
be injured in an accident or attack. Earlier this month, the Bush administration
promised legislation.
Well, that's a start. But the country contains 66,000 chemical and
hazardous-materials plants, according to the government. It contains 5,000
public airports. And 2,800 power plants, of which 104 are nuclear. And 80,000
dams. And 120,000 miles of major railroads. And 2 million miles of pipelines.
And 590,000 highway bridges. And 500 major public transit operations. And more
than 300 seaports. And almost 1,800 federal reservoirs—never mind the municipal
ones.
Each and every one of those facilities is a potential terrorist target. To guard
even a significant fraction of them is a breathtakingly complex problem.
Luckily, the solution may be breathtakingly simple.
In a room in Stamford, Conn., three video screens stand atop a conference table.
They are connected to three motion-sensitive webcams, each pointed out the
window to a street or parking lot outside. If a car passes, a camera e-mails its
picture to a computer. The picture then pops up on the three screens, each
asking a viewer just one question: "Do you see a person or vehicle in this
image?" At the bottom of the picture are three radio buttons. "Yes." "No." "Not
sure." And that's it. That, potentially, is the answer.
The system is called US HomeGuard, and the conference room adjoins the office of
Jay Walker. The 47-year-old Walker is the chairman and founder of Walker
Digital, a research company that invents and develops business systems. Walker's
buttoned-down presentability seems more in keeping with an investor than an
inventor, but he holds more than 200 patents, many of which, bound in scarlet,
line his shelves.
After September 11, Walker notes, "We, like most people, said, 'OK, what can we
do to create solutions to help prevent this from happening again?' " The company
put together a team of a dozen or so people. They took about 10 months to find a
problem they thought they could solve, and another six months to invent the
solution. The problem was trespassers. The solution was citizen watchmen,
working over the Internet.
Most critical infrastructure sites—power plants, dams, oil-storage facilities,
and so on—are located in restricted areas, places where no one except authorized
personnel (maintenance or security staff, for example) should ever be. The
problem is how to watch all those places. Foot patrols would be prohibitively
expensive. Closed-circuit cameras would require full-time monitoring, and the
lack of anything to watch would soon lull the human monitors to sleep.
Terrorists, in any case, could go wherever patrols or monitors weren't looking.
"The terrorists are using our systems against us," Walker says. "We've got to
use the same systems for us." Instead of bringing guards to the critical
infrastructure, bring the infrastructure to the guards.
HomeGuard begins with webcams, arrayed at 100-foot intervals along the periphery
of a restricted site. The webcams are about the size as a digital camcorder and
cost about $1,000 each. Covering a mile of fence would cost about $75,000, which
would add up to about $250,000 for an average industrial plant. For larger
peripheries—say, an airport—just add more cameras. Each camera snaps a picture
at regular intervals—and every time it detects motion.
That, of course, is the easy part. The hard part is watching the cameras.
HomeGuard connects the cameras, via wireless e-mail, to data centers that, in a
matter of seconds, screen out all photos in which no change or movement has
occurred. Fewer than one in a thousand pictures remains, but that still leaves a
lot of pictures. The system then e-mails each questionable picture to three
spotters, and asks whether a person or vehicle is visible.
Spotters? These are ordinary people who enlist to screen pictures over the
Internet. They sign up online and can work whenever they like, for five hours or
five minutes. Sitting at home or anywhere else with Web access, they log on to
HomeGuard's site and look at pictures, saying only whether they see a person or
vehicle in the pictures that appear. Crucially, these spotters have no idea what
they're seeing pictures of. One image might show a length of chain-link fence,
the next a door, the next a catwalk. All they do is say whether they see a
person or vehicle and then click. Next picture.
They're paid for every 100 pictures they evaluate. They can work at their own
speed, but if a spotter doesn't respond to a picture after 20 seconds (perhaps
she has gone to get a sandwich), the system simply e-mails that picture to
another spotter. The system just needs three replies—it doesn't care from whom,
or from where. "There is no 'local' here," Walker says. Americans at the airport
in Bangkok could log in as spotters while waiting for their flight to Taipei.
What if a spotter isn't paying attention? Interspersed with real pictures are
test photos, sprinkled liberally into the mix to check the checkers. People who
are not paying attention (or who are trying to mislead the system) can quickly
be sequestered and given training or bounced off.
Suppose one or more spotters see a person or vehicle in a no-go zone? The data
center immediately sends the same picture, plus photos from nearby cameras, to a
dozen or more other spotters. If those spotters confirm the presence of a person
or car, it's considered definite. Then professionals take over.
Specifically, an alarm goes off at a security center. There, the photos in
question come up on a screen in front of trained personnel who, unlike the
amateurs, know where the site is and who is allowed to be there. Broadcasting
over the Internet, and using microphones and speakers installed in the cameras,
they can challenge the person in the picture on the spot. "Who are you? May I
see your identification?" A maintenance man might be asked to wait while his
identity is confirmed with local management. If the person runs away, his
picture can be e-mailed directly to local authorities. The whole process, from
intrusion to intervention, can take place in 30 seconds or less. Or so says
Walker.
"By using citizens," he says, "we can cover an enormous amount of real estate
without burdening professionals with things they don't need to do." No less
important: None of those citizens would need to do anything complicated or
risky. "We've modeled this system on the human brain," Walker says. Each spotter
is like a neuron, firing a simple binary response. "The neuron doesn't know what
the brain is thinking." It doesn't need to know. The intelligence is in the
system.
Like a neural net, HomeGuard is, in principle, highly redundant—and thus robust.
The sprawling Internet, with its countless pathways, cannot be easily taken
down. Spotters could be literally anywhere. Cameras would constantly report
their own presence, triggering a security response if shut off. Privacy concerns
would be minimal, since all the areas under surveillance would be off-limits to
begin with.
As for the technology, all of it, Walker says, is currently available, either
off the shelf or with inexpensive modifications. About 100 million Americans use
the Internet every month, he notes, so potential spotters abound. The
data-crunching requirements are of the scale that eBay's processing centers
handle every day. All that remains is to try it out. Walker says that a $40
million government investment could fund a live prototype by the end of the
summer. If the system worked, it could be scaled up rapidly. Implementation
could be months, not years or decades, away.
Since unveiling the idea in February, Walker has made a dozen or so
presentations to policy makers in Washington. He proposes to sell the patents to
the government for $1. Asked how his sales pitches are going, Walker replies
dryly: "Urgency and Washington aren't brother and sister."
Here is something those policy makers might want to think about. In the course
of preparing sample images for its HomeGuard mock-ups, Walker Digital sent
people to take pictures of 70 or more power plants, dams, oil-storage tanks, and
other sensitive sites. It sent men dressed in hooded outfits, and carrying large
black satchels, to pose as suspicious intruders. How often were these mock
intruders challenged? Not even once.
© Copyright 2003 National Journal
Jonathan Rauch is a senior writer and columnist for National Journal and a
frequent contributor to REASON. This article was published by National Journal
on April 12, 2003.
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